Consciousness in the Brain: Panel Discussion from the Francis Crick Institute

The Francis Crick Institute hosts a panel led by Brian Cox as they explore the nature of consciousness. Anil Seth, Katarina Schmack, Steve Fleming, and Alex O’Connor discuss how subjective experience relates to brain activity, the limits of localizing consciousness, and how memory, perception, hallucinations, and reality monitoring inform scientific theories. They also tackle consciousness in animals, the role of memory in shaping experience, and the provocative question of artificial consciousness and its ethical implications. The conversation blends neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy to illuminate what science can currently say about why we feel we are conscious.

Introduction and Panel Dynamics

This discussion, hosted at the Francis Crick Institute in London and introduced by Professor Brian Cox, brings together four voices from neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy. Anil Seth from the University of Sussex, Katarina Schmack from the Crick Institute, Steve Fleming of University College London, and philosopher Alex O’Connor join Cox in a multifaceted inquiry into consciousness. The panel emphasizes that consciousness is a central question in science, one that intersects neural activity, subjective experience, memory, perception, and even implications for artificial intelligence. The dialogue moves quickly from definitional ground to empirical approaches, ultimately examining how far science can go in explaining consciousness as a process rather than a detachable thing.

Defining Consciousness

The panel begins with concise definitions. Thomas Nagel’s famous dictum, that consciousness is “what it is like” to be a particular organism, frames the philosophical baseline. Anil Seth aligns consciousness with subjective experience and awareness, while Steve Fleming stresses that consciousness involves processes distributed across networks rather than a single neural locus. Alex O’Connor concurs with Nagel’s emphasis on subjectivity and highlights the challenge for science to grapple with a phenomenon that is fundamentally first-person. The group agrees that a precise, universal definition may be intractable, but consensus can still be built around operationalizable properties and measurable correlates.

Can We See Consciousness in the Brain

Debbie Collins’ audience question prompts the core empirical debate. The panel distinguishes between neural correlates of consciousness and consciousness itself. They discuss how brain regions and energy consumption correlate with conscious states, yet these are not consciousness in the strict sense. The idea of neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) becomes a central framework: scientists can observe brain activity patterns that accompany conscious reports and perceptual experiences, but the subjective experience remains inaccessible directly from measurement alone.

Anil Seth stresses that consciousness emerges from a set of complex processes. Psychophysics is highlighted as a productive approach, quantifying perception, confidence, and imagination and relating them to brain activity. Katarina Schmack adds that the same stimulus may be perceived differently depending on whether it is consciously noticed, underscoring the brain’s interpretive, rather than purely reactive, role. Alex O’Connor cautions that correlations do not capture “what it is like” to experience, pointing to a philosophical limit even as correlations guide predictive theory and practical interventions.

Memory, Time and Consciousness

The relationship between memory and consciousness is examined in depth. The panel notes that consciousness appears temporally extended, integrating information across a window of time. They reference William James’ specious present and the idea that memory shapes the lived experience, influencing how we anticipate the future and empathize with others. Clive Wearing’s amnesia story illustrates how consciousness can persist even when memory fails, prompting questions about what memory adds to conscious experience and how memory contributes to self-identity and continuity.

They discuss how memory disorders like dementia alter conscious experience and complicate the study of consciousness itself, suggesting that memory and consciousness are intertwined but dissociable in important ways. The role of memory in shaping perception and behavior is presented as a crucial clue to the adaptive value of consciousness, potentially enabling organisms to simulate possible futures and learn from past experiences.

Consciousness, Hallucinations and Reality Monitoring

The group examines hallucinations as a window into the brain's predictive machinery. Katarina Schmack notes that hallucinations often arise from prior experiences and expectations, with internal predictions sometimes misfiring in psychosis. The prefrontal cortex is implicated as a monitor of the reliability of sensory signals, enabling reality monitoring. These mechanisms illustrate how internally generated activity can masquerade as external input, offering a testbed for theories about how consciousness integrates internal and external information to create a coherent experience.

Consciousness Across Species, Plants and the Continuum View

Debates about animal and plant consciousness surface, with a careful distinction between subjective experience and observable behavior. The panel discusses animal cognition and the possibility of consciousness as a gradient rather than a dichotomy. Plants are generally viewed as unlikely to be conscious in the sense humans or animals are, though the discussion acknowledges that this is a challenging boundary to draw. The idea of a continuum of consciousness across life forms is presented as a plausible, scientifically testable stance, albeit one that requires careful interpretation of behavioral and neural data.

Free Will, Agency and the Split Brain

The split-brain literature leads to a discussion about agency and the role of consciousness in voluntary action. The famous experiments where the left hemisphere acts as an interpreter and rationalizes actions the right hemisphere initiates hint that much of our sense of having conscious access to reasons may be retrospective. The panel diverges on the existence of free will, with Steve Fleming advocating a view of conscious influence as a form of voluntary control that does not necessarily require a deep redefinition of agency. The broader point is that subjective experience interacts with, but does not wholly determine, action.

Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness

The conversation turns to AI, asking whether artificial general intelligence could be conscious and how one would know. The panel suggests that AI may achieve functional consciousness by fulfilling criteria such as recurrent networks, agency, and shared goals, though there remains a philosophical boundary between simulating consciousness and possessing subjective experience. Some speakers warn of ethical and societal risks in attributing consciousness to AI prematurely, while others argue that AI-driven advances could redefine our understanding of consciousness itself and advance science by offering new paradigms for testing theories.

Theoretical Landscape and Ethics

The participants touch on theories like panpsychism and Integrated Information Theory, noting that while such frameworks can stimulate thought and experimental questions, not all are scientifically testable in the way traditional NCC approaches are. They emphasize a pragmatic program: develop theories that predict and guide interventions, while recognizing that some questions about the intrinsic nature of consciousness may remain philosophical. The episode closes with a sense of productive disagreement, reflecting the vibrant ongoing exploration at the intersection of neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy.