Britain's Defence Investment Plan: Drones, AI and the pursuit of cheaper military power

Short summary

The article examines Britain's Defence Investment Plan (DIP), a technology-led response to postwar budget pressures. Building on the 1957 Sandys defence white paper, DIP prioritises drones, autonomous ships, AI-enabled targeting, and ‘loyal wingman’ drones to extend reach and reduce crew requirements, while highlighting the risks of immature autonomous systems, supply-chain bottlenecks, and the need for resilient communications in contested environments. The piece also contrasts Ukraine’s naval drone usage with Royal Navy demands in the High North and North Atlantic, and questions perceived timelines and affordability.

• Britain’s DIP allocates about £5 billion across four years for drone, autonomy, and AI-enabled systems.
• Drone ships and CCVs aim to disperse combat power and ease personnel shortages.
• AI targeting networks like Asgard seek a tenfold increase in combat power via automation.
• Affordability, industrial capacity, and resilience of communications are key risk factors.

Medium summary

The article analyzes the United Kingdom’s Defence Investment Plan (DIP), a technology-driven strategy framed by the long-running question from the Sandys defence white paper of 1957: how to preserve defence weight with limited economic resources. It argues that while the technologies have evolved from guided missiles to autonomous systems and AI-enabled networks, the underlying dilemma remains: sustain defence heft without expanding conventional capabilities. DIP’s core promise is to transform warfare by leveraging autonomy to reduce crew requirements, extend sensor coverage, and distribute military power across a “hybrid fleet” of Crewed Combat Vessels (CCVs) and uncrewed boats. This approach is intended to complement, not replace, crewed platforms, with Type 45 destroyers to be retired or replaced by a networked architecture of unmanned and autonomous platforms.

The first major pillar discussed is the development of drone ships. The DIP contemplates a networked navy where CCVs act as control hubs for specialised unmanned craft, including Type 91 missile barges, Type 92 and 93 ASW platforms, and Type 94 radar vessels. The Royal Navy’s experience with unmanned systems, such as using the RFA Lyme Bay as a mothership for autonomous mine countermeasures, is cited as encouraging but not yet a substitute for proven, mission-ready autonomous warships. The plan also notes substantial challenges: ensuring resilient communications, robust electronic warfare protections, and the mature integration of autonomous platforms. Ukraine’s naval drones are acknowledged as a rough template; the Black Sea operations do not capture the North Atlantic and High North’s demanding anti-submarine tasks. The DIP aims for a proven, scalable autonomous architecture by the mid-2030s, a timeline aligned with the Type 45’s retirement, but it remains uncertain whether the technology, supply chains, and industrial capacity can meet ambitious cost and reliability targets.

The second major pillar is an AI-targeting network exemplified by Project Asgard within the Army, intended to fuse sensors, armoured vehicles, drones, and long-range weapons into a single, AI-enabled targeting system. First trialled in 2025, Asgard has since received substantial funding (£370 million) to operationalize capabilities that could yield a tenfold increase in combat power primarily through automation rather than larger force numbers. The piece notes a historical parallel with the United States’ network-centric warfare concepts; however, British reservations about affordability and the challenges of creating highly connected forces persist. Critical weaknesses include survivability of networks under electronic warfare, jammed communications, satellite disruptions, and software vulnerabilities. Russia’s electronic warfare capabilities underscore these concerns, highlighting the need for robust safeguards.

Another focal point is the DIP’s emphasis on ‘Loyal wingmen’ through Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCAs) that would fly with RAF Typhoons and F-35s. The prospect of drones acting as scouts, decoys, or radar jammers could extend the reach of piloted aircraft while mitigating risk. The article situates CCAs within a broader NATO context, where future land-force control of long-range weapons could reduce reliance on air power. Boeing’s MQ-28 Ghost Bat is referenced as a real-world example of loyal wingman concepts, though it stresses that CCAs must deliver long range, speed, stealth, resilient data links, and meaningful payloads to be militarily valuable.

On economics and implementation, the DIP is described as a “down payment” rather than a full mortgage. The £5 billion figure, spread across four services and a diverse portfolio, risks being insufficient to transform the force on the timelines many observers expect, given the high costs of autonomous systems, sensors, EW protections, engine reliability, and the necessary industrial capacity. The article also emphasizes that defence production requires robust factory capacity, a skilled workforce, shipbuilding infrastructure, and resilient supply chains. A core assumption is that autonomous systems can mature quickly and scale affordably; the piece cautions that the staying power of conventional forces remains strong, and that autonomous technologies rarely replace enduring fundamentals.

Towards the end, the piece reflects on the Kremlin-linked judgement call that will hinge on future developments in autonomy, affordability, and scale. It frames the DIP as a strategic bet on a future architecture that could keep the UK competitive in a tense security environment, while acknowledging significant operational and political risks. The conclusion is cautious: autonomy and new technologies may reshape warfare, but governments must ensure that the spending profile and industrial readiness align with the ambition to deliver credible, scalable, and affordable capabilities.

Overall, the article portrays DIP as a strategic reorientation toward technologically driven, cost-conscious military power, grounded in historical debates about maintaining strategic advantage in a resource-constrained environment, while recognizing that the path from theory to battlefield capability remains uncertain and contingent on multiple, interlinked factors.